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Ghosts in America: Working
Towards Building a Legal
Framework for Stateless
Individuals in the United States
Asako Ejima *
Abstract
There are “ghosts” living in the United States. These “ghosts” are
stateless individuals who have no nationality and live without the
protections of any State. These individuals pose an intractable problem
for the countries where they live and the international community.
While these individuals are not entitled to live in a country under that
country’s immigration laws, they cannot be removed from that country
because other countries are unwilling to take them. This presents both
a political problem for the country where they live and a human
problem for the stateless individual. On one hand, countries waste time
and resources trying to remove stateless individuals. On the other hand,
without a country willing to take them in, these stateless individuals
are left in “limbo” and without basic access to health care, civil rights,
welfare, and housing. Consequently, they are incredibly vulnerable to
exploitation. It is crucial to protect these communities and facilitate
their access to the basic necessities that most of us take for granted.
Policy recommendations that accommodate their most immediate needs
will be the most effective in providing them with that relief.
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Introduction
There are “ghosts” living in the United States. 1 And they present
an intractable problem for both the international community and the
United States. “Ghosts” are refugees in a foreign country who have no
country to call home. 2 “Ghosts” is an appropriate name for these
individuals because they and their needs are invisible to the States they
live in and the international community as a whole.
Tatianna Lesnikova is one of these ghosts. 3 In 1992, Tatianna and
her son David fled Ukraine because she feared for her son’s safety under

1.

See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Helping the World’s
Stateless People, at 2 (Sept. 2011) [hereinafter Helping the World’s
Stateless People].

2.

See id. at 4.

3.

U.N. High Comm’r For Refugees Wash., Statelessness in the United
States: Searching for Citizenship, YOUTUBE (Oct. 10, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=37&v=1LO78hivXZ8
[https://perma.cc/6WK7-588Q] [hereinafter Statelessness in the United
States]; Shaminder Dulai & Moises Mendoza, Stateless: The Ultimate
Legal
Limbo,
NEWSWEEK
(Apr.
10,
2015,
6:36
AM),
https://www.newsweek.com/stateless-ultimate-legal-limbo-319461
[https://perma.cc/A8QN-NXW5]; U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees &
Open Soc’y Just. Initiative, Citizens of Nowhere Solutions for the Stateless
in the U.S., at 1 (Dec. 2012) [hereinafter Citizens of Nowhere].
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the new Ukrainian government. 4 Soviet officials had taken and
institutionalized Tatianna’s eldest son for speaking out against the
government and although the Soviet Union had collapsed, the new
Ukrainian government was controlled by many of the same people who
had been in charge under the Soviets. 5 When Tatianna arrived in the
United States, she filed for asylum but was denied by United States
immigration authorities who did not find her fears of oppression
credible. 6 After an appeal process that lasted a decade, her final appeal
was denied in 2002. 7 During that decade, Tatianna established a life in
Springfield, Massachusetts where she made a living as a piano teacher
and certified nurse thanks to a special work permit that was renewed
once a year. 8
One morning, Tatianna and her son were handcuffed, shoved in a
van, and detained for nearly three months by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). 9 She had not committed a crime. 10 She was
just simply without legal status. 11 United States immigration officials
tried to deport Tatianna and her son, but they found that she was not
given citizenship by Ukraine because she and her family left Ukraine
before they fulfilled the residency requirements necessary for
citizenship. 12 Because she does not have legal status in any country, she
was deemed non-deportable and released after months of detainment. 13
This experience left her traumatized and left the country with an alien
who was not entitled to be here but had nowhere to go. 14

4.

Dulai & Mendoza, supra note 3.

5.

Id.

6.

Id.

7.

Id.

8.

Id.

9.

Id.

10.

U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees & Open Soc’y Just.
Initiative, supra note 3, at 1; see Stateless People: Protection of the
Rights, ANTI-DISCRIMINATION CTR. (Jan. 7, 2020),
https://adcmemorial.org/en/strategy_cases/stateless-people-protectionof-the-rights/ [https://perma.cc/B4CK-Z94M] (“Detention of stateless
persons . . . in Russian Federation can not be considered legitimate as
deportation is not feasible in such cases.”).

11.

U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees & Open Soc’y Just. Initiative, supra note
3, at 1.

12.

Id.

13.

Id.

14.

Statelessness in the United States, supra note 3.
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People like Tatianna are called “legal ghosts.” 15 These individuals,
who are sometimes also referred to as “nonindividuals” and “nowhere
individuals,” are stateless. 16 Today, an estimated 12 million individuals
around the world are stateless, which means that they are not
considered nationals by any State. 17 Although solid statistics are
unavailable, their numbers could range anywhere from several hundreds
to four million in the United States. 18 Stateless individuals present a
challenge to international and state law because countries that want to
deport them have no place to send them, and yet they are reluctant to
confer upon them a path to citizenship or permanent residence if they
are not eligible for such relief under their own country’s immigration
law. 19 Despite this tension, it is in the best interest of the United States
to establish a legal framework that protects stateless individuals. The
gap in humanitarian protections for stateless individuals unnecessarily
taxes the United States immigration system. 20 Removing a person who
has nowhere else to go is taxing on immigration resources, court
resources, and detention facilities. 21
Not only does this present a legal problem for both domestic and
international law, it also presents a human problem for the stateless
individual. 22 Because stateless individuals are not considered legal
residents of where they live, they have limited access to birth
registration, identity documentation, education, health care, legal
employment, property ownership, political participation, and freedom

15.

Helping the World’s Stateless People, supra note 1, at 2.

16.

Id.; see also TEDX TALKS, Nowhere People: Exposing a Portrait of the
World’s Stateless, YouTube (Feb. 24, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u9DD6MZj5Z4&list=WL&index=3
&t=0s [https://perma.cc/RJ5L-XLXZ].

17.

U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Action to Address
Statelessness: A Strategy Note, at 4 (Mar. 2010) [hereinafter UNHCR
Action to Address Statelessness].

18.

See John Corgan, The Stateless in the United States, CTR. FOR
MIGRATION STUD., https://cmsny.org/the-stateless-in-the-united-states/
[https://perma.cc/2J8Q-SJBM]; Nick Keppler, Trump’s Agents are
Trying to Deport a Stateless Man with Nowhere to Go, VICE (Aug. 28,
2017, 5:30 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/nee99z/trumpsagents-are-trying-to-deport-a-stateless-man-with-nowhere-to-go
[https://perma.cc/MR6V-K5FZ].

19.

See Keppler, supra note 18.

20.

David C. Baluarte, Life After Limbo: Stateless Persons in the United
States and the Role of International Protection in Achieving a Legal
Solution, 29 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 351, 359 (2015).

21.

Id.

22.

UNHCR Action to Address Statelessness, supra note 17, at 4.
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of movement. 23 They may also face other barriers including travel
restrictions and social exclusion. 24 As a result, they experience increased
vulnerability to sexual and physical violence, human trafficking,
exploitation, and forcible displacement. 25
The tragedy of statelessness is that it is a man-made problem.26
And so far, neither the international community nor the national
authorities have adequately addressed it. On an international scale, a
collective action problem hinders global cooperation towards reducing
the number of stateless individuals as individual countries hesitate to
confer their nationality onto stateless individuals, hoping that another
country will instead. 27 On a domestic scale, the current immigration
framework used by United States immigration authorities is deaf to the
specific political and economic needs of stateless individuals.28
Unfortunately, the problem of statelessness is intractable without an
international agreement on state responsibility for stateless
individuals. 29
In Part One, I explain the causes of stateless persons. First, I
summarize the political determinants of statelessness; including, state
succession, arbitrary discrimination, and technical causes. Then, I will
put a human face on statelessness by talking about the consequences of
statelessness. In Part Two, I describe the international legal framework
that has proven to be ineffective at providing an international solution.
International cooperation to improve the status of stateless individuals
and reduce or eliminate statelessness has enjoyed limited success for
several reasons. 30 First, the biggest obstacle to an international solution
is a collective action problem resulting from the tension between

23.

Id.

24.

Anna Roberts, No Place to Run: The Forgotten Vulnerabilities of the
Stateless, O’NEILL INST. (Oct. 3, 2016), https://oneill.law.georgetown.edu/noplace-to-run-the-forgotten-vulnerabilities-of-the-stateless/.

25.

Id.

26.

U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Ending Statelessness Within
10 Years, at 2 (Nov. 2010) [hereinafter Ending Statelessness Within 10
Years].

27.

See id. at 5–6.

28.

Corgan, supra note 18, at 6.

29.

Benjamin Boudreaux, Statelessness, Sovereignty, and International Law:
Promoting the “Right to Have Rights,” in HUMAN DIGNITY AND THE
FUTURE OF GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS 207, 211 (Mark P. Lagon & Anthony
Clark Arend eds., 2014).

30.

Michelle Foster & Hélène Lambert, Statelessness as a Human Rights
Issue: A Concept Whose Time Has Come, 28 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 564,
565.
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international law and individual State sovereignty. 31 Many countries
would identify statelessness as a problem, but no country alone is ready
to be a part of the solution or take on burdens unless other countries
do as well. 32 Although there is a basic international humanitarian
concern for other humans, 33 States retain (and want to retain) the right
to determine nationality as part of State sovereignty. 34 In other words,
while individual States have an interest in diminishing the problem of
statelessness, they would rather not be the ones to grant a particular
stateless group citizenship. 35 Instead, they would rather avoid the
political costs of welcoming stateless individuals and would prefer to
have other States take on the responsibility of nationalizing new groups
of individuals. 36 As a result, while international legal frameworks
currently exist to prevent statelessness, their weaknesses and
historically low rate of commitment to implementation and enforcement
have made them largely ineffective in solving the plight of stateless
individuals. 37 The international community has also considered
protections for refugees and the statelessness separately despite their
similarities with the prioritized focus on refugees. 38 As a result, the
development of protections for stateless individuals has lagged behind
protections for refugee populations. 39 Additionally, stateless individuals
who should have qualified for refugee protections have been denied
those protections because the two categories are being considered
separately. 40 In practice, however, there is substantial intersectionality
between being stateless and being a refugee. 41 And fourth, statelessness
31.

See Boudreaux, supra note 29, at 209–11.

32.

Id. at 211.

33.

Id. at 209.

34.

Id. (“The principle asserting that states determine their own citizens has
been enshrined and advanced by international law, from at least the 1930
Hague Convention on Nationality onward and has been further developed
and applied in judicial cases, such as the Nottebohm case adjudicated in
1955 by the International Court of Justice, which claims that ‘nationality
is within the domestic jurisdiction of the State.’“).

35.

Id. at 211.

36.

Id.

37.

Laura van Waas, Statelessness: A 21st century challenge for Europe, 20
SEC. & HUM. RTS. 133, 140 (2009); Foster & Lambert, supra note 30, at
567.

38.

Guy Goodwin-Gill, Statelessness is Back (Not That it Ever Went Away…),
EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/statelessness-isback-not-that-it-ever-went-away/ [https://perma.cc/57S5-2SCV].

39.

Id.

40.

Id.

41.

Id.
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has been largely perceived as a “technical problem” that can be solved
by remedies involving the “harmonization of laws and co-ordination [of]
rules” by many scholars rather than a human rights issue.42
Consequently, international solutions that solely focus on technical
solutions while ignoring the human rights implications of statelessness
have been largely unproductive. 43
Although the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) has been dedicating itself to ending statelessness by 2024,44
individual countries should put a more active effort into establishing
domestic legal frameworks to alleviate statelessness. Currently,
individual State responses to statelessness have been inconsistent and
often contradictory to the UNHCR’s efforts to end statelessness.45
While countries like Spain and France have established residency
permit programs to confer legal residence to stateless individuals,46
other countries like Australia have been placing stateless individuals in
indefinite detention. 47
In Part Three, I start to explore options for the United States in
the face of international inaction. Currently, the United States lacks a
consistent legal framework for recognizing stateless individuals and
have largely ignored their political and economic needs. 48 Stateless
individuals are currently not recognized or protected under United
States immigration legal framework. 49 Furthermore, despite being a
recipient of a substantial number of stateless individuals, the United
States has mostly adopted unwelcoming approaches to stateless
individuals. 50 Stateless individuals unable to obtain legal status through
the existing immigration legal framework often find themselves
subjected to a life living in limbo. 51 Although they are unable to obtain
42.

Foster & Lambert, supra note 30, at 565 (quoting GS Goodwin-Gill, The
Rights of Refugees and Stateless Persons, in HUMAN RIGHTS
PERSPECTIVE AND CHALLENGES (IN 1990 AND BEYOND) 378, 389 (1994)).

43.

Id.

44.

U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Global Action Plan to End
Statelessness 2014–2024, at 4 (2013).

45.

See Corgan, supra note 18, at 3.

46.

Id.

47.

Ben Doherty, Stateless in Australia: New Centre to Shine Light on Those
Incarcerated without Hope, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 26, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/mar/27/stateless-inaustralia-new-centre-to-shine-light-on-those-incarcerated-without-hope
[https://perma.cc/7RH5-7ZAH].

48.

Corgan, supra note 18, at 6.

49.

Baluarte, supra note 20, at 352.

50.

See id. at 352–53.

51.

Id.
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legal status in the United States, they are non-deportable because they
lack citizenship papers needed to enter any country. 52 Working towards
a solution for stateless individuals that would take them out of legal
limbo in the United States is important because the longer they remain
stateless, the longer they lack the protections afforded to them by an
effective nationality or a country that is prepared to exercise protection
and consular services on their behalf. 53 Because they are invisible, they
are dangerously at risk of slavery, child trafficking, prostitution, police
harassment, recruitment into the armed forces, forced labor, and other
forms of abuse. 54
In Part Four, I will discuss policy options that the United States
can employ while it waits for an international solution. Those options
include: 1) the creation of a new state for the stateless; 2) the placement
of stateless individuals in indefinite detention; 3) the creation of a
residency permit system specifically designed for stateless individuals;
and 4) the adoption of legislative amendments to the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) that incorporates protections for stateless
individuals. It is important to note however that in the absence of an
international approach, there is no perfect solution for the United
States—only the least objectionable solution.

Part One: Understanding Statelessness

A)

Causes of Statelessness

Statelessness can be caused by several factors. 55 These factors
typically fall into three categories: 1) State succession; 2) discrimination
and arbitrary denial or deprivation of nationality; and 3) technical
causes. 56 This Section will introduce and explain each of the three
principle categories.

52.

Id. at 361.

53.

See Invisible and Vulnerable, World’s Stateless Face Bleak Future, DW,
https://www.dw.com/en/invisible-and-vulnerable-worlds-stateless-facebleak-future/a-15350795-0 [https://perma.cc/48KE-VGML].

54.

Id.

55.

U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), What is Statelessness?, at 1
[hereinafter What is Statelessness?].

56.

Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 13.
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1)

State succession

State succession can cause statelessness. 57 State succession occurs
when an existing State splits into two or more states, when part of a
State secedes to form a new State, when territory is transferred from
one State to another, or when two or more States unite to form a new
state. 58 Statelessness happens in this context when an individual fails
or is unable to secure citizenship in the successor states. 59 For example,
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav Federation left
millions stateless throughout Eastern Europe and Asia. 60 More than 20
years later, hundreds of thousands of individuals in that region are still
stateless or at risk of statelessness. 61 Expectations that the succeeding
State will ensure that all individuals receive the new State’s citizenship
are complicated by lingering animosity and discrimination between
various populations within the original state. 62
2)

Arbitrary denial or deprivation of nationality

Statelessness is sometimes caused by ethnic or religious
discrimination, 63 like in the case of one million Rohingya in Myanmar,64
700,000 Burkinabe in Cote d’Ivoire, 65 over 100,000 Dominicans of
Haitian descent, 66 and some 300,000 Urdu-speaking Biharis.67
Statelessness is also often caused by discrimination against gender. 68 In
26 countries, including Kuwait, Lebanon, and Qatar, mothers are
unable to pass their nationality to their children due to gender-

57.

Id.

58.

Id.

59.

Id.

60.

U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Mapping Statelessness in the
U.K., at 23 (Nov. 2011) [hereinafter Mapping Statelessness in the U.K.].

61.

Id.

62.

Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 13.

63.

Lorena Rios, Stateless People in the US Have Begun to Unite for the
First Time, TRT WORLD (June 29, 2018),
https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/stateless-people-in-the-us-havebegun-to-unite-for-the-first-time-18541 [https://perma.cc/A4PW-P54D].

64.

Id.

65.

Id.

66.

Id.

67.

Id.

68.

Citizens of Nowhere., supra note 3, at 14.
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discriminatory legislation. 69 For example, in Senegal, male nationals can
always pass on Senegalese nationality to their children but female
nationals whose children are born out of wedlock, or with a foreigner,
must jump through administrative hoops to confer nationality to her
children. 70
3)

Technical causes

“Technical causes” refers to situations where statelessness is
accidently caused by gaps in a country’s nationality laws and conflicts
between different countries’ citizenship laws. 71 The most common
technical way that can cause statelessness is incompatibilities between
countries’ nationality laws. 72 Countries most often grant nationalities
through either blood relationship (jus sanguinis) or through birth in
the country (jus soli). 73 When a child is born to nationals of a country
that grants nationality based on jus soli, a country that only confers
nationality based on jus sanguinis may not be able to acquire any
nationality at birth. 74 Other “technicalities” include: denying
nationality to abandoned children, automatic loss of nationality of
individuals who reside abroad without registering with a consulate after
a specified period of time, and marriage practices of certain countries,
under which a non-national loses their citizenship when they marry of
a national. 75 Finally, statelessness can also occur when individuals are
unable to prove nationality. 76 For example, parents from migrant,
displaced, or nomadic communities may have a hard time getting birth
certificates for their children in countries with cumbersome
requirements for birth registration, such as unreasonable deadlines,
excessive fees, or burdensome document requirements. 77

69.

Id.

70.

Mapping Statelessness in the U.K., supra note 60, at 24.

71.

Citizens of Nowhere., supra note 3, at 14.

72.

Id.

73.

Id.

74.

Id.

75.

Id.

76.

Id.

77.

Id.
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B)

Consequences of Statelessness

The consequences of a lack or loss of nationality are devastating
socially, politically, and economically. 78 Research has shown that the
stateless are among the world’s most vulnerable populations.79
Statelessness affects a myriad of rights; such as: education,
employment, social welfare, housing, healthcare, freedom of movement,
freedom from arbitrary detention and political participation. 80 Stateless
individuals are also more likely to encounter travel restrictions, social
exclusion, and are more vulnerable to sexual and physical violence,
exploitation, trafficking in individuals, forcible displacement, and are
at an increased risk of radicalization. 81
Stateless individuals are also frequently subjected to or at risk of
prolonged or indefinite arbitrary detention. 82 Unlike foreign nationals
with some form of nationality, stateless individuals can be subject to
lengthy detention while they attempt to prove that they are not a
national of any State. 83 Also unlike foreign nationals, a stateless
individual who cannot acquire asylum status often cannot be returned
because they have no State of nationality to return to or their country
of origin or habitual residence will not take them back. 84 Consequently,
stateless individuals in countries that have no limit on detention face
long-term or indefinite detainment. 85 Stateless individuals in countries
with a limit on detention face a lifetime of worrying about when or if
officials might try to deport them again. 86 For example, in Australia,
non-citizens who do not have a valid visa must be detained until they
78.

See generally What is Statelessness?, supra note 55 (outlining negative
effects of statelessness on individuals).

79.

van Waas, supra note 37, at 133.

80.

What is Statelessness?, supra note 55.

81.

Jeri L. Dible, The Social and Political Consequences of Another Stateless
Generation in the Middle East, (Feb. 23, 2016) (Monograph, Command
and
General
Staff
College)
(released
to
public)
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1039168.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/2BW8-C84H].

82.

Katherine Perks & Jarlath Clifford, The Legal Limbo of Detention, 32
FORCED MIGRATION REV. 2, 42 (2009).

83.

Id.

84.

See, e.g., id.

85.

Id.; see, e.g., Kelly Burke, Immigration Deadlock as 50 Asylum Seekers
Detained Indefinitely for Being Stateless, 7 NEWS (Sept. 3, 2019),
https://7news.com.au/politics/immigration-policy/immigrationdeadlock-as-50-asylum-seekers-detained-indefinitely-for-being-stateless-c433296 [http://perma.cc/LK8T-SAUU].

86.

Corgan, supra note 18, at 6–7.
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are either granted a visa or leave the country. 87 Since there is no limit
on immigration detention under Australian law, 88 individuals can be
held in detention for very long periods of time (theoretically for their
entire lives). 89
C)

International legal framework protecting stateless individuals

There are several legal instruments that address statelessness;
including, Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), which affirms that “everyone has the right to a nationality”
and “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied
the right to change his nationality.” 90 Additionally, there are two
statelessness-specific legal instruments. 91
The two main statelessness-specific legal instruments are the 1954
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless individuals 92 (1954
Convention) and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness 93 (1961 Convention). The 1954 Convention’s most
significant contribution to international law is its recognition of the
international legal status of “stateless individuals.” 94 It established the
definition of a stateless individual as someone “who is not considered a
national by any State under the operations of its law.” 95 This definition
is now recognized as customary international law. 96 The 1954
87.

REFUGEE COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, STATELESSNESS IN AUSTRALIA 15
(2015), https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/wpcontent/uploads/2018/12/1508-Statelessness.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E2Z2-SKU7].

88.

Id.

89.

Id.

90.

G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 15, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Dec. 10, 1948); see What is Statelessness?, supra note 55.

91.

Id.

92.

See Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Sep. 28, 1954,
360 U.N.T.S., 117 [hereinafter 1954 Convention].

93.

See Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Aug. 30, 1961, 989
U.N.T.S. 175 [hereinafter 1961 Convention].

94.

See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Protecting the Rights of
Stateless Persons: The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons at 4 (Jan. 2014) [hereinafter Protecting the Rights of Stateless
Persons].

95.

1954 Convention, supra note 92, at art. 1.

96.

See generally id.; See also Tamás Molnár, Remembering the Forgotten:
International Law Regime Protecting the Stateless Persons–Stocktaking
and New Tendancies, 11 U.S.-CHINA L. REV. 822, 831 (2014).
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Convention guarantees stateless individuals access to courts (Article
16), 97 a right to employment (Article 17), 98 a right to housing (Article
21), 99 a right to administrative assistance (Article 25), 100 and a right to
identity and travel documents (Article 27 and 28) among others. 101
The 1954 Convention was seen as a temporary measure while States
continued to devise solutions to prevent statelessness. 102 In comparison,
the 1961 Convention gave States tools to avoid and solve
statelessness. 103 The 1961 Convention lists safeguards in four main areas
to be implemented by States to prevent and reduce statelessness. These
include measures to avoid statelessness among children (Article 1 to
4), 104 measures to avoid statelessness due to loss or renunciation of
nationality (Article 5 to 7), 105 measures to avoid statelessness due to
deprivation of nationality (Articles 8 and 9), 106 and measures to avoid
statelessness in the context of State succession. 107 These legal
instruments do not constitute an exhaustive list. 108 Protections against
statelessness are also embedded in several human rights treaties and
regional treaties. 109
Despite the efforts of their well-intentioned drafters, the two
statelessness-specific conventions have inherent weaknesses that have
impeded a successful international resolution to statelessness. 110 The
main issue is that the two conventions have not gained widespread

97.

1954 Convention, supra note 92, at art. 16.

98.

Id. at art. 17.

99.

Id. at art. 21.

100. Id. at art. 25.
101. Id. at arts. 27–28.
102. Protecting the Rights of Stateless Persons, supra note 94, at 9.
103. Id.
104. See generally 1961 Convention, supra note 93, at art. 1–4 (setting
guidelines for assigning nationalities at birth to persons who would
otherwise be stateless).
105. Id. at arts. 5–7.
106. Id. at arts. 8–9.
107. See generally id. at art. 10 (securing nationalities for persons as a result
of transfer).
108. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Preventing and Reducing
Statelessness: The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, at
6 (Mar. 2014).
109. David Weissbrodt & Clary Collins, The Human Rights of Stateless
Persons, 28 HUM. RTS. Q. 245, 246 (2006) (listing human rights treaties
that have statelessness provisions).
110. See van Waas, supra note 37, at 137.
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acceptance. 111 Only 94 countries are contracting parties to the 1954
Convention, 112 and only 75 countries are contracting parties to the 1961
Convention. 113 Increased ratification efforts of relevant instruments will
contribute to a more overall effective international legal framework. 114
There are also problems with the conventions’ normative content.115
The 1954 Convention only requires that Contracting States “shall as
far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of stateless
individuals” (Article 32). 116 In other words, the Convention does not
impose an obligation on States to confer nationality on stateless
individuals. 117 Without a conferral of nationality, a stateless individual
remains stateless and at risk of all the consequences discussed above.118
Furthermore, the 1954 Convention only applies to stateless individuals
who are lawfully present or lawfully staying in the Contracting State.119
The 1961 Convention fails to oblige States to bestow or retain
nationality. 120 Therefore, an individual can still become or remain
stateless in that State. 121 Furthermore, neither Conventions, nor the
international legal framework as a whole, guarantees an individual a
“home state” to which he or she can always return and from which he
or she cannot be expelled. 122

Part Two: International Responses to Statelessness
In Part Two, we will look at the UNHCR’s and other countries’
approaches towards statelessness. While some countries have made
concerted efforts to cooperate with the UNHCR’s efforts to end
statelessness, other countries’ treatment of stateless individuals are
inconsistent and often contradictory to the UNHCR’s efforts to end

111. Id.
112. See 1954 Convention, supra note 92.
113. See 1961 Convention, supra note 93, at art. 1–4.
114. van Waas, supra note 37, at 138.
115. Id.
116. See 1954 Convention, supra note 92, at art. 32.
117. See id.
118. Protecting the Rights of Stateless Persons, supra note 94, at 5.
119. van Waas, supra note 37, at 138.
120. Id.
121. See generally id.
122. Id.
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statelessness. 123 These incongruent approaches to statelessness have
hindered the overall international effort to end statelessness.
A)

The UNHCR’s #IBelong Campaign

The UNHCR is the United Nations (UN) agency that is responsible
for responding to the needs of stateless persons. 124 However, the
UNHCR’s responsibility for stateless persons was largely overshadowed
by its work with refugees and internal displacement issues. 125 Overtime,
the UNHCR’s responsibilities regarding stateless individuals has
expanded. 126 Statelessness has now become one of the UNHCR’s core
budget activities. 127
On November 4, 2014, the UNHCR launched its #IBelong
Campaign, which aims to end statelessness by 2024. 128 The goals of this
UNHCR initiative includes resolving major situations of statelessness
and preventing new cases from emerging. 129 The UNHCR has focused
its efforts on persuading and supporting states to take key actions to
sever the vicious cycle of statelessness. 130 Those key actions include: 1)
ensuring that every birth is registered to help establish legal proof of
parentage and place of birth, 2) ensuring that all children are granted
nationality if they would otherwise be stateless, 3) removing gender
discrimination from nationality laws so that women can pass on their
nationality to their children on an equal basis as men, 4) resolving
current situations of statelessness through changes to legislation or
government policy, and 5) eliminating discrimination because of race,
ethnicity, religion, gender, or disability. 131
Since the UNHCR’s campaign began, more than 166,000 stateless
people have acquired or had their nationality confirmed, twenty states
have acceded to the Statelessness Conventions, nine states have
established or improved statelessness determination procedures, six
states reformed their nationality laws, and another two have eliminated
123. See, e.g., id. at 139 (discussing Myanmar’s open violation of international
norms by granting status based on national race).
124. Katia Bianchini, Protecting Stateless Persons: The Implementation of the
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons Across EU States
11 INT’L REFUGEE L. SERIES 59, 63 (2018).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 65.
128. What is Statelessness?, supra note 55.
129. Id.
130. Ending Statelessness Within 10 Years, supra note 26, at 21.
131. Id. at 21–22.
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gender discrimination preventing women from passing on their
nationality to their children. 132 However, millions remain stateless,133
showing that much more still needs to be done. The UNHCR’s efforts
have been met with varied levels of support from countries around the
world. 134 While countries such as Madagascar and Sierra Leone have
reformed their nationality allows and now allow mothers, as well as
fathers, to confer citizenship on their children, 135 25 countries still make
it impossible for mothers to confer their citizenship to their children.136
B)

Countries that have adopted Statelessness Determination Procedures

Many countries have made substantial progress towards conferring
status to stateless individuals in their country. About a dozen States
worldwide have established Statelessness Determination Procedures
(SDP). 137 SDP are mechanisms by which stateless persons are identified
and granted a legal status in the country in which they are found in.138
France has the oldest mechanism for recognizing and protecting
stateless persons. 139 Italy, Hungary, Latvia, and Spain followed suit
some decades later. 140 Moldova, Georgia, the Philippines, Costa Rica,
the U.K., Kosovo, and Turkey have also established SDP in the last

132. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Four Years into Its #IBelong Campaign
to End Statelessness, UNHCR Calls for More Action by States,
(Nov.
13,
2018),
https://www.unhcr.org/enUNHCR.ORG
us/news/press/2018/11/5be95d7c4/four-years-its-ibelong-campaign-endstatelessness-unhcr-calls-resolute.html. [https://perma.cc/WG3V-J8SC].
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, High-Level Segment on Statelessness:
Results and Highlights, at 25 (May 2020).
136. Lisa Schlein, UNHCR: Anti-Refugee and Migrant Sentiment Threaten
Battle to End Statelessness, VOA (Oct. 7, 2019 5:35 PM),
https://www.voanews.com/europe/unhcr-anti-refugee-and-migrantsentiment-threaten-battle-end-statelessness
[https://perma.cc/9E6JQPW9].
137. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Good Practices Paper — Action 6:
Establishing Statelessness Determination Procedures to Protect Stateless
Persons 2 (July 11, 2016) [hereinafter Good Practices Paper].
138. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Statelessness Determination
Procedures: Identifying and Protecting Stateless Persons, 1–3 (Aug. 2014)
[hereinafter Stateless Determination Procedures].
139. Good Practices Paper, supra note 137, at 2.
140. Id.
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decade. 141 Although States have broad discretion in the design and
operation of their SDP, SDP are commonly formalized in law and
include protections such as residency permits, the right to work, access
to healthcare and social assistance, and the issue of identity papers and
a travel documents. 142 Although their numbers are still relatively few,
countries that have adopted SDP are greatly contributing to the
reduction of global statelessness. Happily, there is a growing interest
around the world for introducing similar procedures. 143
C)

Countries That Could Do More

There are many other countries who could do more to contribute
to global efforts to reduce statelessness. Their reluctance towards
providing more protections for stateless individuals has hindered the
eradication of statelessness on a global scale. 144 For example, the Swiss
office of the UNHCR published a study slamming Switzerland for its
conservative approach when it comes to protecting the rights of
stateless individuals. 145 The UNHCR found that Switzerland has been
applying a particularly restrictive practice of recognizing statelessness
and has instead put its own sovereignty over the needs of protecting
stateless individuals. 146 Further, Swiss law does not currently guarantee
hearings, legal representation, translation or interpretation, or a formal
residency permit to individuals applying for recognition of
statelessness. 147 Europe, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, the Czech
Republic, and Sweden also lack legal frameworks to identify stateless

141. Id.
142. Id. at 7–8.
143. See Statelessness Determination Procedures, supra note 138, at 1–3.
144. See, e.g., William Thomas Worster, European Union Citizenship and the
Unlawful Denial of Member State Nationality, 43 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
767 (2020).
145. Switzerland Could Do More for the Stateless, UN Body Finds,
SWISSINFO.CH (Nov. 13, 2018 5:27 PM),
https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/without-rights-_switzerland-could-domore-for-the-stateless--finds-un-body/44542630.
[https://perma.cc/KN8F-GNHC].
146. Id.
147. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), Étude sur L’apatridie en
Suisse, UNHCR SUISSE, https://www.unhcr.org/dach/ch-fr/en-bref/quinous-aidons/mettre-fin-a-lapatridie/lapatridie-en-suisse-et-auliechtenstein/etude-sur-lapatridie-en-suisse (last visited on Sep. 19, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/AM56-JEZH].
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persons. 148 These States force stateless individuals into refugee
determination procedures. 149 These procedures often treat stateless
persons as other irregular migrants; as a result, their vulnerabilities and
need for special protection are ignored. 150 For example, in the
Netherlands, applicants are required to show official evidence to
support their claim that they cannot return to the country, which is
difficult when an applicant is unable to obtain official evidence. 151 In
Sweden, officials take a strict approach on proving identity, which is
an even greater burden on stateless individuals who often do not have
access to birth certificates or government identification. 152 Greece
appears to provide the least protection of all States, as it refuses to
grant permits to persons who are unable to leave the country. 153
Another country with a terrible reputation regarding their
treatment of stateless individuals is Australia. 154 When Australia was
asked by the UNHCR how many stateless people were within its
borders, Australia answered there were zero. 155 However, after some
investigating, information emerged that there were 37 stateless people
being held by the Australian government in immigration detention, on
average for more than two-and-a-half years. 156 Some people, like Said
Imasi, have been in immigration detention for over nine years. 157 Under
Australia’s current legal framework, he could—theoretically—be
incarcerated for the rest of his life because the Australian government
refuses to release him from detention or grant him a protection visa.158
Many other stateless individuals have been detained indefinitely in
immigration detention as well as in offshore centers on Nauru and
Manus Islands. 159 Further, Australia does not have a procedure for

148. Katia Bianchini, Not a Level Playing Field — Statelessness Determination
in the EU, EUROPEAN NETWORK ON STATELESSNESS (July 20, 2017),
https://www.statelessness.eu/blog/not-level-playing-field-statelessnessdetermination-eu [https://perma.cc/QKV3-R6VY].
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Inquiry into the Australian Citizenship
Amendment (Citizenship Cessation) Bill 2019, ¶ 3 (Oct. 14, 2019).
155. Doherty, supra note 47.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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determining statelessness within its legislative framework. 160 Nor does
it have a specific visa for stateless individuals despite a public pledge
in 2011 “committed to minimising the incidence of statelessness and to
ensuring that stateless person are treated no less favourably than people
with an identified nationality.” 161 Such a promise rings hollow if not
supported by concrete reform.

Part Three: Statelessness in the United States
In Part Three, we will discuss how statelessness fits under the
United States’ current immigration legal framework and the United
States’ current approaches to statelessness.
A)

Statelessness under United States Immigration Law

Individuals who are already living in the United States when they
apply for protection from persecution are referred to as “asylum
seekers” or “asylum applicants.” 162 In order to be granted asylum, the
applicant must meet the definition of “refugee” under the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA). 163 To meet the definition of “refugee,” an
asylum applicant must demonstrate that he or she is “outside any
country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having
no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last
habitually resided,” that he or she is “unwilling or unwilling to return
to” and is “unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of that country” because of “a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.” 164 The second reference to
the term “nationality” in the refugee definition specifically allows for
protection of stateless individuals. 165 Because they have no nationality
or cannot establish nationality, stateless individuals must demonstrate
that he or she is “outside any country in which such person last
160. Michelle Foster, Jane McAdam, & Davina Wadley, Part One: The
Protection of Stateless Persons in Australian Law —The Rationale for a
Statelessness Determination Procedure, 40 MELBOURNE UNIV. L. REV.
401, 421 (2016).
161. Doherty, supra note 47.
162. DREE K. COLLOPY, AILA’S ASYLUM PRIMER: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
U.S. ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDURE 52 (Am. Immigr. Law. Ass’n 8th ed.
2019).
163. Id.
164. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
165. Id.
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habitually resided.” 166 They must also establish persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution in such country of last habitual residence.167
While a stateless individual may be recognized as a refugee under
United States law, 168 they encounter a myriad of challenges because of
their stateless status. 169 First, while United States courts have
recognized that statelessness may be a contributing factor for
establishing asylum eligibility, United States courts have generally held
that statelessness alone is not an independent ground for establishing
asylum eligibility. 170 For example, in Fedosseeva v. Gonzales, the court
rejected a Latvian applicant’s asylum application deeming the fact that
she was rendered stateless due to the fall of the Soviet Union
irrelevant. 171 Therefore, they also have to meet the burden of
demonstrating a well-founded fear of persecution on account of a
protected ground in the country of their “last habitual residence” rather
than in their country of nationality. 172 This can prove difficult given
that many adjudicators do not understand the nature of their suffering
as individuals without a nationality, and fail to grasp the nature of the
harm that they have suffered or that they will likely suffer in the
future. 173 Furthermore, the novelty of adjudicating asylum claims of
stateless individuals can lead to prejudicial errors in findings of fact and
law. 174 As a result, many do not qualify for asylum and are left without
legal status. 175 And so they fall into a loophole in United States
immigration law that treats the stateless as if they were in the country
illegally and offers no clear way of adjudicating their claims to stay if
their asylum claims are rejected. 176

166. Id.; see also U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status ¶¶ 89, 101–105
HCR/1P/4/enG/Rev. 3 (2011) [hereinafter UNHCR Handbook].
167. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 166, ¶¶ 90, 102 at 19–20
168. Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 18.
169. Baluarte, supra note 20, at 366.
170. Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 18; see, e.g., Faddoul v. Immigr. &
Naturalization Serv., 37 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 1994); Al Najjar v. Ashcroft,
257 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2001); Fedosseeva v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 840 (7th
Cir. 2007); Pavlovich v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 613 (8th Cir. 2007).
171. See Fedosseeva, 492 F.3d at 845.
172. Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 18.
173. Baluarte, supra note 20, at 366–67.
174. Id. at 366.
175. Id. at 353.
176. Dulai & Mendoza, supra note 3.
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Stateless individuals who have failed to obtain asylum often find
themselves in removal proceedings. 177 The majority of stateless
individuals encountered by UNHCR in the United States have a final
order of removal issued against them and have therefore spent some
time in immigration detention awaiting removal from the United
States. 178 Most of these individuals have experienced tremendous
emotional trauma during detention; including the stress of detention
itself, the removal from their daily life, transfers to different
immigration detention facilities away from their homes and
communities, the uncertainty of how long they will be detained since
no country recognizes them, and fears about being sent to a country
with which they have no connection. 179 Furthermore, the burden is on
the stateless individual to pursue release from detention because there
is no right to counsel provided by the government. 180 Even if a stateless
individual is released, they can be subsequently detained again, even
though nothing in their situation had changed. 181
The United States is not a signatory to either the 1954 Convention
or the 1961 Convention. 182 However, there is room in the United States’
immigration and refugee legal framework for conferring stateless
individuals a path to citizenship. 183 The United States definition of
“refugee” is more expansive than the “refugee” definition provided by
the 1951 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
(1951 Convention) in ways that are especially pertinent to stateless
individuals. 184 First, unlike the definition of “refugee” in the 1951
Convention, the definition of “refugee” in the INA encompasses those
who suffered persecution in the past but no longer face a threat of
future persecution. 185 Therefore, a stateless individual who has suffered
177. See Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 20.
178. Id. at 25.
179. Id.
180. Polly J. Price, Stateless in the United States: Current Reality and a Future
Prediction, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 443, 482 (2013).
181. Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 20.
182. Corgan, supra note 18.
183. See DONALD KERWIN ET AL., STATELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES:
A STUDY TO ESTIMATE AND PROFILE THE US STATELESS POPULATION
14 (2020).
184. Maryellen Fullerton, The Intersection of Statelessness and Refugee
Protection in US Asylum Policy, 2 J. MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 144, 149
(2014). See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees art. 1(A), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S at 137 [hereinafter 1951
Convention].
185. Fullerton, supra note 184. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); 1951
Convention, supra note 184.
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severe past persecution may be able to receive protection in the United
States even if they lack evidence of current or future persecutory
threats. 186 Second, the United States definition requires that the
persecution be linked to either race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion, 187 which are frequently
the basis for hostility directed against groups that are stateless.188
Lastly, under the 1951 Convention, remaining in the country where
they reside precludes an individual from refugee protection. 189 This is
problematic for stateless individuals who frequently lack access to the
travel documents needed to cross international borders and have no
choice but to remain in the country where they are being persecuted.190
However, under the United States refugee definition, individuals who
have not left their country of nationality of residence may still receive
protection. 191
Despite the ways in which the United States’ refugee definition
could be used to increase the likelihood of conferring asylum to stateless
individuals, case law is sparse. There are two federal court opinions, in
2010 and 2011, that address claims for protection raised by stateless
individuals. 192 In 2010, in Haile v. Holder, the 7th Circuit Court of
Appeals examined an asylum claim of Temesgen Woldu Haile, a young
man born in Ethiopia to parents of Eritrean background who fled
Ethiopia when war broke out in 1998 between Ethiopia and Eritrea
over territorial boundaries. 193 Both countries conducted mass
deportations of thousands of citizens and residents of the “wrong”
background. 194 For example, Ethiopia expulsed more than 75,000
Ethiopian citizens of Eritrean descent, rendering them stateless. 195 The
Court ruled that in some circumstances, forced denaturalization could
constitute persecution. 196 The Court held that “to be deported to the

186. Fullerton, supra note 184.
187. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
188. See Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 13.
189. 1951 Convention, supra note 184, at art. 1(C).
190. Fullerton, supra note 184, at 150.
191. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (“in the case of a person having no nationality,
within the country in which such person is habitually residing, and is
persecuted or has a well-founded fear of persecution…”)
192. Fullerton, supra note 184, at 150.
193. Haile v. Holder, 591 F.3d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 2010).
194. Id.
195. Fullerton, supra note 184, at 160.
196. Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 19 (citing Haile v. Holder, 591 F.3d
572, 574 (7th Cir. 2010)).
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country that made you stateless and continues to consider you stateless
is to be subjected to persecution.” 197
In 2011, in Stserba v. Holder, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed the asylum claim of Lilia Stserba, a woman born in Estonia
to an ethnically Russian family. 198 Stserba received her medical training
in Russia but practiced medicine in Estonia. 199 After Estonia achieved
independence from the Soviet Union, Stserba and her husband did not
qualify for citizenship under the new Estonian law, presumably because
they did not speak Estonian. 200 Consequently, they became stateless.201
Two years later, due to an electoral change, Stserba and her husband
received Estonian citizenship. 202 Five years after that, Estonia stopped
recognizing scientific degrees issued by Russian institutions. 203 Due to
its retroactive effect, Stserba claimed that she became unable to
practice medicine in Estonia. 204 Stserba claimed that the two years that
she was stateless constituted persecution by the Estonian
government. 205 The immigration judge denied her asylum on the
grounds that Stserba regained citizenship relatively quickly and had
not suffered “any adverse consequences” during the time she was
stateless. 206 The BIA affirmed. 207 However, the 6th Circuit took a more
nuanced approach, stating that “a person who is made stateless due to
his or her membership in a protected group may have demonstrated
persecution, even without proving that he or she has suffered collateral
damage from the act of denationalization.” 208
The decisions in Haile and Stserba are significant in the context of
statelessness in the United States legal framework because they
recognize that statelessness itself can constitute severe harm, the
vulnerability that accompanies being stateless, and that when the
government takes actions to render an individual stateless, it should
give rise to a presumption of persecution. 209 Further, these decisions
197. Haile, 591 F.3d at 574.
198. Stserba v. Holder, 646 F.3d 964, 968–69 (6th Cir. 2011).
199. Id. at 969.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 968–969.
206. Id. at 971.
207. Id. at 978–979.
208. Id. at 974 (citing Haile v. Holder, 591 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2010)).
209. Id.
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conform to the idea that when individuals cannot rely on their home
states to protect them from persecution, they should be able to turn to
other states for protection. 210
B)

Current approaches to statelessness

The primary concern guiding the United States’ approach to
stateless individuals is that stateless individuals cannot be lawfully
deported because, unlike regular foreign nationals, they have no state
to return to. 211 To provide context, there are two ways to apply for
asylum under the current United States immigration framework:
affirmative asylum and defensive asylum. 212 An applicant applies for
asylum affirmatively if they are physically present in the United States
and they file within one year after their arrival in the United States.213
Applicants apply for asylum affirmatively with the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). 214 If an affirmative
asylum applicant’s request for asylum is denied or if the applicant was
apprehended by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the
applicant applies for asylum defensively in front of an Immigration
Judge (IJ). 215 One of the first steps in the United States’ defensive
asylum process is the designation of a country of removal.216 The
problem is that an applicant who is stateless has no country of removal
to designate or even if a stateless applicant designates a country of
removal, that designated country may not accept that applicant’s
return. 217 This complication makes hosting stateless individuals
undesirous for the United States because the United States does not
want to become a “dumping ground” for other countries’ unwanted
minorities. 218 Consequently, most of the United States’ current
210. Id. at 973; Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 18–9 (citing Haile v.
Holder, 591 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2010)).
211. Kelly Staples, How to Eliminate Statelessness, WORLD ECONOMIC
FORUM (Nov. 13, 2014),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/11/how-to-eliminatestatelessness/ [https://perma.cc/A55P-77RN].
212. Fact Sheet: U.S. Asylum Process, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION FORUM (Jan.
10, 2019), https://immigrationforum.org/article/fact-sheet-u-s-asylum-process/
[https://perma.cc/H67G-U6AF].
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(b)(1)–(2); Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 19.
217. Adam L. Fleming, Around the World in the INA: Designating a Country
of Removal in Immigration Proceedings 7 IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR 4, 10
(2013).
218. Staples, supra note 211.
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approaches to statelessness has been geared towards declining to
permanently host stateless individuals. 219 This section will discuss three
main United States responses to statelessness: 1) “recalcitrant” country
designations and visa sanctions; 2) orders of supervision; and 3)
repatriation agreements. 220 Two of these policies, “recalcitrant” country
designations and repatriation agreements, compel countries to accept
stateless individuals removed from the United States. 221 Order of
supervision is the method by which stateless individuals are able to
remain in the United States but without legal status. 222
1)

“Recalcitrant” countries and visa sanctions

When Congress implemented the Immigration and Nationalization
Act (INA) in 1952, it gave broad authority to the DHS and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to remove certain foreign nationals from
the United States. 223 One provision in the INA that contributes to this
broad authority is Section 243(d), which provides for the
“discontinuance” of visa issuances as a penalty for countries that refuse
to take back their “citizens, subjects, nationals, and residents” who
have been ordered deported from the United States. 224 In other words,
the United States can impose visa sanctions to try to compel
cooperation with its removal decisions. 225 Since the INA’s
implementation in 1952, the United States used Section 243(d) during
the Cold War to restrict visa issuances to certain Soviet bloc
nationals. 226 Between the Cold War and 2016, the provision was used
only once, against Guyana in 2001 to remove 113 criminally convicted
219. See Baluarte, supra note 20, at 352–53.
220. See Immigration: “Recalcitrant” Countries and the Use of Visa
Sanctions to Encourage Cooperation with Alien Removals, CONG.
RSCH. SERV. (Jan. 23, 2020),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/IF11025.pdf [https://perma.cc/42RFQZU9 ] [hereinafter Recalcitrant] (defining “recalcitrant” as “countries
that systematically refuse or delay the repatriation of their citizens”).
221. Id.
222. Corgan, supra note 18.
223. Recalcitrant, supra note 220.
224. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 §243(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(d);
Discontinuance of Visa Issuance Under INA 243(d), NAFSA (Apr. 13,
2020), https://www.nafsa.org/professional-resources/browse-byinterest/discontinuance-visa-issuance-under-ina-243d
[https://perma.cc/9SMG-AEGU].
225. Recalcitrant, supra note 220.
226. Id.

381

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 53 (2021)
Ghosts in America: Working Towards Building a Legal Framework for
Stateless Individuals in the United States

Guyanese nationals in United States custody that the DOJ deemed
dangerous. 227 The next time the provision was used was in October 2016
against The Gambia, when it resisted pressure from the United States
to cooperate with the repatriation of its nationals. 228 This decision came
right after a July 2016 House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform hearing in which ICE and the Department of State (DOS)
discussed various measures used to persuade recalcitrant countries to
cooperate. 229
In January 2017, 230 shortly after he took office, President Donald
Trump issued Executive Order 13748, “Enhancing Public Safety in the
Interior of the United States.” 231 Section 12 of the Executive Order,
“Recalcitrant Countries,” directs DHS and the DOS to utilize INA
Section 243(d) to impose visa sanctions on countries designated as
“recalcitrant.” 232 It also requires the Secretary of State to “ensure that
diplomatic efforts and negotiations with foreign states include as a
condition precedent the acceptance by those foreign states of their
nationals who are subject to removal from the United States.” 233 As of
September 8, 2018, the DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) has designated ten countries (including Cuba, Eritrea, Iran,
Pakistan, Bhutan, China, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia) as
recalcitrant. 234 An additional 24 are considered “at risk of noncompliance” (ARON). 235
The problem with this unilateral use of a diplomatic “stick” is that
it may impede friendly bilateral relationships between the United States
and other countries. 236 Some countries may retaliate in ways
detrimental to bilateral trade, tourism, law enforcement, or other forms
of cooperation. 237 It would also isolate the United States from the rest
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.; see generally Recalcitrant Countries: Denying Visas to Countries that
Refuse to Take Back Their Deported Nationals Before the Comm. on
Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (2016).
230. Matthew Sussis, Getting Even Tougher on Recalcitrant Countries,
FOR
IMMIGRATION
STUDIES
(Apr.
15,
2019),
CENTER
https://cis.org/Sussis/Getting-Even-Tougher-Recalcitrant-Countries.
231. Recalcitrant, supra note 220, at 2.
232. See id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1.
235. Id. (currently, countries designated as “recalcitrant” include; Cuba,
Eritrea, Iran, China, Burma, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Hong Kong).
236. Id. at 2.
237. Id. at 2–3.
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of world and could have negative impacts on economic cooperation
between the United States and other countries. 238 Furthermore, visa
sanctions are not the only tool available to the United States
government to encourage cooperation. 239 Examples of such alternative
measures include the issuance of a demarche (i.e., a formal diplomatic
request); holding a joint meeting with the country’s ambassador to the
United States, DOS, and ICE; providing notice of the United States
government’s intent to exercise visa sanctions to gain compliance; and
calling for inter-agency meetings to pursue withholding of aid other
funding. 240
2)

Order of supervision

If a stateless individual is unable to obtain legal status in the United
States, they cannot be lawfully deported from the United States. 241 In
these cases, an immigration judge has the discretion to release a
stateless individual under order of supervision. 242 Orders of supervision
are authorized under INA §241 and the regulatory authority is provided
in 8 C.F.R 241.5. 243 Under this program, if a detained noncitizen cannot
be removed within a reasonable time after receiving an order of
removal, the noncitizen must be released from detention. 244 Many
stateless individuals are released under an order of supervision. 245 To
comply with orders of supervision, they must check in regularly with
immigration officials, obtain advanced approval to travel beyond
specified times and distances, provide notices of change of address, and
continue to try to obtain travel documents, which most likely ends up

238. Recalcitrant Countries: Denying Visas to Countries that Refuse to Take
Back Their Deported Nationals Before the Comm. on Oversight and
Government Reform, supra note 229.
239. Recalcitrant, supra note 220.
240. Recalcitrant Countries: Denying Visas to Countries that Refuse to Take
Back Their Deported Nationals Before the Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform, supra note 229.
241. See Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 20.
242. Corgan, supra note 18.
243. See RUTGERS SCHOOL OF LAW-NEWARK IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC,
FREED BUT NOT FREE: A REPORT EXAMINING THE CURRENT USE OF
ALTERNATIVES TO IMMIGRATION DETENTION 5 (2012) [hereinafter
FREED BUT NOT FREE]; Immigration and Nationality Act §241; 8 U.S.C
§1231 (2018); 8 C.F.R 241.5.
244. See Immigration and Nationality Act §241; 8 U.S.C §1231(a)(3) (2018).
245. FREED BUT NOT FREE, supra note 243, at 19.
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a futile endeavor. 246 In the meantime, a stateless individual is eligible
for work authorization and able to legally work in the United States—
provided that they complete the yearly application and pay the annual
processing fee. 247 Orders of supervision are also cost effective
alternatives to detention. Whereas detention costs an average of $122
per day per detainee, alternatives to detention range in cost from $0.30
to $14 per day per individual. 248
Although stateless individuals under order of supervision may seem
more fortunate than others who are not under order of supervision,
order of supervision is nowhere near a perfect solution and is fraught
with problems. 249 First, there is no cognizable end date to orders of
supervision. 250 For stateless individuals with no means to gain lawful
status, order of supervision could last their entire lifetime. 251 Stateless
individuals have challenged these conditions under a variety of
constitutional theories but have been unsuccessful. 252 Second, the
regular reporting requirements impose psychological and emotional
hardships on stateless individuals. 253 Many stateless individuals fear
they may be taken into immigration custody each time they report to
the immigration office for having inadvertently failed to comply with
the terms of the order, for having run out of consulates or embassies to
contact in order to request travel documents, or in some cases for no
apparent reason at all. 254 Other psychological effects of check-in
requirements include insomnia, loss of appetite, anxiety, stress,
paranoia, and general lack of willpower to continue with one’s
immigration proceedings. 255 Further, there are extra psychological
burdens placed on families with mixed immigration status because there
is a threat of family separation due to removal every time an individual
goes for a check-in. 256 Third, travel restrictions under order of

246. Corgan, supra note 18; Baluarte, supra note 20, at 364–365.
247. Corgan, supra note 18.
248. FREED BUT NOT FREE, supra note 243, at 10.
249. Corgan, supra note 18.
250. See Baluarte, supra note 20, at 365.
251. Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 26.
252. Baluarte, supra note 20, at 365 (citing Berry v. Adducci, No. 10-10969,
2010 WL 2105130 (E.D. Mich. May 25, 2010); Abusheikh v. Attorney
General of United States, 225 F. App’x 56 (3rd Cir. 2007)).
253. Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 26.
254. Id.
255. FREED BUT NOT FREE, supra note 243, at 17.
256. Id.
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supervision negatively affect family unity. 257 Stateless individuals under
order of supervision cannot obtain United States passports or
international travel documents. 258 This means that they are
permanently separated from loved ones. 259 Many stateless individuals
express a great sense of sadness and loss at the thought of never being
able to see their parents, siblings, or children again or to attend
funerals, weddings, or births of loved ones. 260 Fourth, monitoring
stateless individuals in perpetuity is both unnecessary and a waste of
scarce immigration resources. 261 And fifth, the opportunity cost of
keeping otherwise productive individuals in a constant state of
economic instability is detrimental to an efficient society. 262 The
frequency and duration of check-ins negatively impacts an individual’s
ability to work. 263 Due to the long wait times associated with check-ins,
individuals often miss a half or even a full day of work in order to
comply with the check-in requirements. 264
3)

Repatriation agreements

In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). 265 IIRAIRA amended the INA
to subject a broader category of aliens to mandatory detention during
removal proceedings until they can be repatriated to their home
country. 266 The INA, as amended by IIRAIRA, allows the government
90 days to remove an alien following the issuance of a final order of
removal. 267 However, stateless individuals cannot be removed within
this period because their home countries are unwilling to accept them
or because their home countries do not have a repatriation agreement
with the United States. 268 These individuals who have nowhere to go
257. Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 27.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Baluarte, supra note 20, at 366.
262. Id.
263. FREED BUT NOT FREE, supra note 243, at 16.
264. Id.
265. Plight of the Tempest-Tost: Indefinite Detention of Detention of
Deportable Aliens, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1915, 1920 (2002).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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were detained indefinitely by the INS under IIRIRA. 269 Legal challenges
to this indefinite detention were consolidated into the case Zadvydas v.
Davis. 270 The Court in Zadvydas concluded that where deportation is
not “reasonably foreseeable,” the INA does not authorize continued
detention. 271 The Court concluded that the INA had a presumptive
post-removal detention period of 6 months, after which, if the alien
provides “good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the government must
respond with evidence…to rebut [the alien’s] showing.” 272 Therefore,
unless the government can show that there is significant likelihood of
removing the alien, the alien must be released. 273
Repatriation agreements are a mechanism used by the United
States to deport otherwise non-deportable individuals such as stateless
individuals. 274 Repatriation is defined as “the act or process of restoring
or returning someone of something to the country of origin, allegiance,
or citizenship.” 275 In the context of United States immigration policy,
repatriation agreements are diplomatic agreements between the United
States and a country that previously refused to accept deportees from
the U.S, in which noncitizens in the United States with an order of
removal against them are forcibly returned to their country of origin.276
Countries may not deport an individual to their country of origin unless
there is a repatriation agreement in place between the repatriating
country and the receiving country. 277
Repatriation agreements are nothing new and their effectiveness is
questionable. In 2008, the United States entered into an agreement with

269. Megan Peitzke, The Fate of “Unremovable” Aliens Before and After
September 11, 2001: The Supreme Court’s Presumptive Six-Month Limit
to Post-Removal-Period Detention, 30 PEPP. L. REV. ISS. 4 769, 771
(2003).
270. Id.
271. Id. (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001)).
272. Id. at 771–772.
273. Id. at 772.
274. See Price, supra note 180, at 481.
275. Repatriation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/repatriation?utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm
_source=jsonld [https://perma.cc/U4CS-H86R].
276. See Price, supra note 180, at 481.
277. See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Note on Voluntary
Repatriation, Note Submitted by U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees,
EC/SCP/13 (Aug. 27, 1980),
https://www.unhcr.org/excom/scip/3ae68cce8/note- voluntaryrepatriation.html [https://perma.cc/CAB5-NM8Q].
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Vietnam to deport Vietnamese nationals. 278 Under the agreement, the
United States government pays the cost of repatriation under the
agreement and the Vietnamese government issues travel documents
authorizing return, once the deportee is determined to be a national of
Vietnam. 279 Article 2, Section 2 of the agreement exempted Vietnamese
citizens “who arrived in the United States before July 12, 1995, the date
on which diplomatic relations were re-established between the United
States Government and the Vietnamese Government.” 280 In 2017, the
Trump administration unilaterally determined this exemption did not
apply to convicted criminals. 281 The Vietnamese government stopped
issuing the required travel documents and the United States
government had to suspend the repatriation program. 282 The United
States also entered into a similar agreement with Cambodia in 2001.283
Not only is the effectiveness of these types of agreements
questionable, they also impose substantial emotional and mental
burdens on the individuals they affect. 284 Individuals with final orders
of removal who are not deportable live day-to-day not knowing if or
when they would be deported. This imposes a toll on an individual’s
mental health. 285 Further, many stateless individuals have been here
since they were children and now many of them have partners, United
States citizen-children, and steady jobs. 286 Forcing them to leave the
United States and return to an unfamiliar country would be devastating
for them given that their entire lives are rooted in the United States.
278. Price, supra note 180, at 481.
279. Id.
280. Ellen K. Boegel, Donald Trump and the Complicated Diplomacy of
Deportation, AMERICA THE JESUIT REVIEW (July 28, 2019),
https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2019/01/28/donald-trump-andcomplicated-diplomacy-deportation [https://perma.cc/Z767-RNK9].
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Price, supra note 180, at 481–2.
284. See generally NAT’L ASIAN PAC. AMERICAN WOMEN’S F. & SE. ASIA
RES. ACTION CTR., DREAMS DETAINED, IN HER WORDS: THE EFFECTS
OF DETENTION AND DEPORTATION ON SOUTHEAST ASIAN AMERICAN
WOMEN AND FAMILIES 4–20 (2008).
285. Southeast Asia Resource Action Center, The Devastating Impact of
Deportation on Southeast Asian Americans, https://www.searac.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/The-Devastating-Impact-of-Deportation-onSoutheast-Asian-Americans-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6224-82YB].
286. See Shannon Dooling, 40 Years After the Vietnam War, Some Refugees
Face Deportation Under Trump, NPR (Mar. 4, 2019, 9:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/03/04/699177071/40-years-after-thevietnam-war-some-refugees-face-deportation-under-trump
[https://perma.cc/P6DA-TKCL].
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It would also be financially devastating on the family they leave behind
in the United States.

Part Four: Policy Recommendations for the United
States
Part Four explores the possible policy recommendations for the
United States, starting with the least desirable solutions and ending
with the most desirable. This Section will conclude that the best
recommendation is a needs-based solution that synthesizes what
stateless individuals need most with what is practically possible in the
current political climate. This Note does not claim that the most
desirable solution is the perfect solution. However, because of the
intense vulnerability that stateless individuals endure, 287 it is imperative
that there be a meaningful effort to find the best solution for them. For
this discussion, we will not consider “recalcitrant” countries and visa
sanctions, indefinite orders of supervision, and repatriation programs as
possible solutions because their downsides have been discussed at length
earlier in this Note.
As a threshold issue, the United States should accede to the 1954
Convention and the 1961 Convention. 288 First, due to increased global
migration and intermarriages between citizens of different States, more
individuals have to deal with complicated legal and procedural
requirements to establish their citizenship. 289 By acceding to both
statelessness conventions, there will be increased legal transparency
and predictability with respect to other States, as more States accept
the rules contained in these treaties. 290 Second, if more States accede to
the statelessness conventions, there will be greater international
cooperation to prevent statelessness. 291 Third, in acceding to the
statelessness, States undertake to identify potential stateless
populations and take measures to prevent and reduce statelessness
287. Eric Schwartz, Civil Society Can Move Forward on Statelessness in the
United States, REFUGEES INT’L (Nov. 13, 2018),
https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2018/11/13/civil-societycan-move-forward-on-statelessness-in-the-united-states
[https://perma.cc/4G2R-RBX7].
288. Id.
289. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), The Statelessness
Conventions Campaign Why States Should Accede to the 1954 and 1961
Statelessness Conventions (Oct. 2010),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/4cb6b2052.html
[https://perma.cc/4AKN-96TQ].
290. Id.
291. Id.
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within their borders. 292 Identifying and addressing the risks of
statelessness could have a positive impact in allowing for larger parts
of society to participate fully in a country’s economic and social
development. 293 And finally, by acceding to the statelessness
conventions, the United States demonstrates a commitment to human
rights and its cooperation with the international community to reduce
and eliminate statelessness and respect the dignity of all individuals in
need of protection. 294
But ascension by itself is not enough. More should be done to meet
the needs of stateless individuals and it is more feasible that one may
think. First, unlike other migration issues, the challenge is not as
overwhelming 295 because the population is relatively small. 296 The
number of stateless persons, although hard to determine, 297 is unlikely
to be in the hundreds, or even tens of thousands. 298 Second, stateless
individuals are vulnerable in ways that both political parties have been
concerned about in recent years. 299 Stateless individuals, especially
women without access to status, employment, or education are more
susceptible to trafficking. 300 Third, causes of statelessness are often
linked to human rights violations that resonate with both political
parties. 301 Lastly, the need for a legal framework for stateless individuals
has previously come up in Congress. 302 The first legislative proposal
that would provide a pathway for stateless individuals in the United
States to obtain legal status was introduced in 2010 and again in 2011
as part of a larger bill known as the Refugee Protection Act (RPA).303
The provisions pertaining to statelessness authorized the Secretary of
DHS and the United States Attorney General to provide conditional
lawful status to certain stateless individuals who are otherwise
inadmissible or deportable from the United States. 304 The proposal
would have also made stateless applicants eligible for work
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See id.
295. Schwartz, supra note 287.
296. Baluarte, supra note 20, at 357.
297. See Corgan, supra note 18.
298. Schwartz, supra note 287.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 28–29.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 29.
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authorization and the spouse or child of a recipient of conditional lawful
status could also qualify for conditional lawful status if they met certain
criteria. 305 Then in 2013, the bipartisan Border Security, Economic
Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (S. 744) was
introduced in Congress, which included provisions that would have
incorporated stateless individuals into United States immigration
law. 306 The proposal included: a legal definition of stateless person that
would be incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA);
an application procedure, which includes eligibility criteria, exclusions
and waivers, rules for employment authorization, and derivative
beneficiaries; considerations for stateless persons to adjust status to
Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR); some information about
evidentiary considerations; and provisions establishing rules for
administrative review, reopening proceedings, and judicial review. 307
A)

A New State for the Stateless

The first recommendation is the creation and addition of a new
state (with a lower case “s”) in the United States for the stateless. This
“51st” state would accept all stateless individuals who were not granted
asylum and provide them with shelter and means of living. 308 The state
would be governed by a local state government and be part of the
federal United States government, the same as our current 50 states.309
The United States Constitution grants general state-creation
powers to Congress in Article IV, Section 3, under the Admissions
Clause. 310 The clause states, “New States may be admitted by the
Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be forced or erected
within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by
the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the
Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the
Congress.” 311 While the creation of a new state in the United States is
305. Id.
306. Corgan, supra note 18; Baluarte, supra note 20, at 353.
307. Baluarte, supra note 20, at 372.
308. See VIK SASI, WORLD REFUGEE AGENCY, FEASIBILITY STUDY:
SACROSANCTUARY, A STATE FOR THE STATELESS PRELIMINARY
REPORT 3 (2019).
309. See Admission of and the Rights of New States: Doctrine and Practice,
ANNOTATED,
CONST.
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artIV-S3-C1-1-12/ALDE_00001171/ [https://perma.cc/Q7WD-GHRB].
310. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §3.
311. Id.
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theoretically possible based on this clause, 312 there is simply not enough
unclaimed land in the North American continent to build a new state
large enough to hold enough people to solve the statelessness problem.313
Consequently, the only way for a new state to be created and added to
the United States is if one or some of the current 50 states gave up part
of their land for the creation of a new state of stateless individuals.314
That would require consent from the legislatures of those states as well
as Congress. 315
This proposal is the least desirable solution because of its
unlikeliness due to the logistical complexity of implementation and the
low possibility of popular and political support. Even if there was
enough state cooperation to free up enough land to create a “51st” state
for stateless individuals, there are substantial logistical considerations
that would make this project difficult to actuate. The stateless
population in the United States is ethnically diverse and geographically
spread out. 316 Stateless individuals in the United States range from
former Soviet citizens, ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis, Romas,
Syrians, Palestinians, Nepalis, Rohingyas, Hmongs, and many other
ethnic groups from all over the world. 317 These stateless individuals live
in states all across the country including California, New York, Texas,
Ohio, Minnesota, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Georgia, and
Virginia. 318 This creates two concerns. The first concern is how to
identify the stateless individuals that would make up the new state.
The stateless population is difficult to identify in United States
government data and more broadly in United States society because no
government entity makes statelessness determinations or systematically
collects information on stateless populations. 319 Additionally, the
United States lacks a path for stateless persons to register or secure
312. The Annenberg Guide to the United States Constitution: Article IV,
Section 3, ANNENBURG CLASSROOM,
https://www.annenbergclassroom.org/article-iv-section-3/
[https://perma.cc/AB53-5J93].
313. See generally Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration,
Statelessness, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/otherpolicyissues/statelessness/#:~:text=How%20Many%20Stateless%20People%20
Are,10%20million%20due%20to%20underreporting
[https://perma.cc/925N-KFWX].
314. See Sasi, supra note 308, at 6.
315. The Annenberg Guide to the United States Constitution, supra note 312.
316. See KERWIN ET AL., supra note 183 at 40–54.
317. See id.
318. See id. at 54.
319. Id. at 6.
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legal status, which makes stateless persons less likely to disclose their
status. 320 Therefore, it is currently impossible to determine statelessness
without exhaustive, individual screening. 321 Even if we were able to
identify stateless populations, they live and are settled in many
different parts of the country. 322 Many stateless individuals report
having United States citizen-children and grandchildren. 323 Several of
them own their own businesses and homes. 324 Many attended schools in
the United States and are active members of their community.325
Displacing them and moving them to a new state would uproot their
lives and create substantial burdens on them and their families. 326
The second concern is whether individuals from different countries,
speaking different languages and adhering to different customs, would
be able to communicate and co-exist. 327 Most successful (and
unsuccessful) attempts to create a new state in the United States were
prompted by groups of individuals with a common interest living in the
same region. 328 For example, Utah’s addition as a state was spurred by
the Mormon exodus to the Salt Lake basin in the mid-1840s. 329 In the
early twentieth century, 46 counties in Texas and 23 counties in
Oklahoma tried to form their own state called Texlahoma because
people in rural areas of northern Texas and western Oklahoma were in
desperate need of roads but felt ignored and “forgotten” by their state
legislatures. 330 These examples show the large role that a group of
likeminded individuals play in the development of a new state. In
contrast, the stateless population is far less homogenous in their ethnic,
religious, and cultural background and interests. 331 It will be difficult to
locate a region in this country with enough stateless individuals to
support the formation of a new state for stateless individuals in that
location.
320. See id.
321. Id. at 14.
322. See id. at 53–54.
323. Id. at 69.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. See id.
327. Sasi, supra note 308.
328. See Beyond 50: American States That Might Have Been, NPR (Apr. 2,
2010 12:15 PM),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125142955
[https://perma.cc/XB8S-UMTJ].
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. See Corgan, supra note 18.
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B)

Indefinite Detention

The second recommendation would be to indefinitely detain all
stateless individuals in the United States who were not granted asylum
status. This is one of the least desirable solutions for several reasons.
First, indefinite detention is a violation of due process. 332 Courts have
found that the Constitution prohibits pre-trial mandatory detention
unless there is proof of danger or a flight risk. 333 Federal courts in New
York, Massachusetts, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Colorado, Oregon,
and California found that the same is true for immigration cases.334
Second, indefinite detention is prohibited by the Supreme Court’s
rulings in Zadvydas v. Davis in 2001 and Clark v. Martinez in 2005.335
As a result of these cases, after six months of detention, the burden
shifts to the United States government to prove that the removal of a
noncitizen in deportation proceedings is possible in the reasonably
foreseeable future. 336 This standard prevents stateless persons from
becoming “lifers” – held indefinitely in detention facilities. 337 Third,
keeping stateless individuals indefinitely in detention will be a wasteful
financial endeavor. 338 Detaining individuals in immigration detention is
costly to the taxpayer. 339 It costs the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) on average $58 a day per detainee and $500,000 per day
cumulatively to detain aliens in state and local jails. 340 Detaining
individuals indefinitely also carries social and economic costs. 341 Many
of those detained are longtime residents of the United States with U.S.
citizen family members who depend on them for economic and
332. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001).
333. Analysis
of
Immigration
Detention
Policies,
ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/other/analysis-immigration-detention-policies
[https://perma.cc/EXN6-Z8G8].
334. Id.
335. Corgan, supra note 18; Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (holding
that non-U.S. citizens admitted to the U.S. but subsequently ordered
removed cannot be detained beyond the 90-day removal period for any
longer than “reasonably necessary” to effectuate their removal from the
country); Clark v. Suarez Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005) (holding that
Zadvydas was also applicable to inadmissible immigrants).
336. Corgan, supra note 18.
337. Id.
338. See Baluarte, supra note 20, at 366.
339. Analysis of Immigration Detention Policies, supra note 333.
340. Id.
341. See id.
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emotional support. 342 Indefinite detention interferes with their ability
to work and support their families, resulting in additional costs to the
government, which often must step in and provide for these families.343
Fourth, the cost of time spent by detention and removal officers on
follow-up with countries that will not claim stateless individuals is
wasteful spending. 344 For example, Keyse Jama was a Somalian national
who argued that Somalia would never issue him travel documents
because it did not have a functioning government. 345 The United States
Supreme Court held that the immigration officials did not need the
target country’s consent for removal. 346 Given the high-profile nature of
his case, Immigration officials promptly flew Jama to Somalia on a
private jet and hired private escorts to take him through the airport.347
However, because Jama did not have travel documents, he was denied
entry into Somalia and sent back to the United States. 348 This failed
attempt to remove Keyse Jama cost taxpayers an estimated two
hundred thousand dollars. 349 While this is not a common occurrence, it
demonstrates the potential excessive cost to the taxpayer from an
unsuccessful deportation attempt.
C)

A Legislative Solution

The fourth recommendation would be the implementation of a
legislative solution modelled after the 2013 S. 744 bill (S. 744 2.0),350
which would incorporate stateless individuals into the United States
immigration legal framework. S. 744 proposed a legal definition of
stateless person that would be incorporated into the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA); an application procedure, which includes
eligibility criteria, exclusions and waivers, and rules for employment
authorization and derivative beneficiaries; considerations for stateless
persons to adjust status to Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR); some
information about evidentiary considerations; and provisions
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Baluarte, supra note 20, at 366.
345. Id. at 362.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. See generally Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration
Modernization Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter Border
Security].
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establishing rules for administrative review, reopening proceedings, and
judicial review. 351
There are many attractive aspects of S. 744. First, and most
importantly, it would create a pathway for a stateless person who does
not qualify as a refugee to submit to a very similar process and acquire
rights very similar to that of a refugee. 352 Next, it also makes stateless
individuals that apply for stateless status eligible for work authorization
as soon as they are determined to be prima facie eligible. 353 The bill
provides an opportunity for a stateless person to become eligible for
travel documents, which would allow stateless individuals reunify with
their families. 354 Finally, it provides a path to citizenship by providing
the opportunity to a stateless individual to adjust their status to Lawful
Permanent Resident (LPR) and obtain their green card after one
year. 355
S. 744 2.0 would include necessary improvements to S. 744 so that
it is even more effective at providing legal protections to stateless
individuals in the United States. First, S. 744 fails to specify the
standard of proof for establishing that one is a “stateless person” under
the law. 356 Ambiguity regarding a standard of proof leaves room for the
courts and the BIA to set a high standard of proof. 357 A high standard
of proof would place a heavy burden on the stateless individual to prove
a negative (that they do not have legal status in any country) and put
them in a situation where they may be unable to obtain the required
documentation from their originating country that shows they are not
citizens of that country. 358
S. 744 2.0 is a politically desirable option for the United States to
adopt while it waits for an international solution to statelessness. It
works within the realm of the United States’ existing immigration legal
framework while also harmonizing with the international legal
framework, the Statelessness Convention, and the recent guidance
published by UNHCR in the Statelessness Handbook. 359 Unfortunately,
it is arguably not a politically viable option. S. 744 was a bipartisan

351. Baluarte, supra note 20, at 372.
352. Id. at 373.
353. Id. at 376; Border Security, supra note 350.
354. See Baluarte, supra note 20, at 377.
355. See generally Border Security, supra note 350; Baluarte, supra note 20, at
377.
356. Baluarte, supra note 20, at 380.
357. Id. at 385.
358. Id.; see also Bianchini, supra note 124.
359. Baluarte, supra note 20, at 378.
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bill when it was first introduced to Congress in 2013. 360 However, the
political attitude towards immigrants and immigration has changed
dramatically for the worse since 2013. 361 The current administration is
unabashedly hostile towards immigrants. 362 They have sharply cut legal
immigration, tried to build a “wall” across the entire U.S.-Mexico
border, increased arrests and removals of unauthorized immigrants,
banned nationals from eight countries from entering the U.S., tried to
cancel the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program,
and reduced refugee admissions to the lowest number since the statute
guiding refugee resettlement was enacted in 1980. 363 Additionally,
political anti-immigrant and anti-immigration rhetoric has strongly
impacted how many Americans view immigrants. 364 Nearly a quarter of
Americans call immigration a “problem.” 365 That is “more than double
the percentage who characterized it that way in 2015, and the highest
share since Gallup began asking that question a quarter-century ago.”366
The sharp decline in immigration’s popularity makes it unlikely that
we will see comprehensive legislation that expands the United States’
legal immigration framework.
D)

A Needs-Focused Solution

Stateless individuals have immediate needs, which legislative
solutions will not work quickly enough to meet. Therefore, the most
desirable policy recommendation is one that is cognizant of the
immediate needs of stateless individuals that is practical and capable
360. Philip E. Wolgin, 2 Years Later, Immigrants Are Still Waiting on
Immigration Reform, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 24, 2015, 9:05
AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2015/06/2
4/115835/2-years-later-immigrants-are-still-waiting-on-immigrationreform/ [https://perma.cc/CM8Y-JYNT].
361. See generally SARAH PIERCE & ANDREW SELEE, MIGRATION INST.,
IMMIGRATION UNDER TRUMP: A REVIEW OF POLICY IN THE YEAR
SINCE THE ELECTION 1 (2017).
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Tyler Anbinder, Trump has Spread More Hatred of Immigrants than any
American in History, THE WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2019 10:03 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/trump-has-spread-morehatred-of-immigrants-than-any-american-inhistory/2019/11/07/7e253236-ff54-11e9-8bab-0fc209e065a8_story.html
[https://perma.cc/Z2EK-B2BL].
365. Id.
366. Id.
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of quick implementation. In other words, the most desirable policy
recommendation is not a legislative solution. The first thing to do is
identify a stateless individual’s needs and what, if anything, is impeding
that need. This Section will address the following needs of stateless
individuals: 1) legal status; 2) release from psychological, emotional,
and mental insecurity; 3) economic stability; and 4) freedom to travel.
1)

Legal status

Arguably, the biggest need of stateless individuals is legal status.
Without legal status, they live in limbo without knowing whether they
will be permitted to stay or face deportation to their countries of
origin. 367 Their best hope for legal status in the United States is a grant
of asylum. However, United States courts have consistently found that
statelessness is not an independent ground for asylum. 368 Therefore, a
stateless individual whose application for asylum is denied by USCIS is
at the mercy of an Immigration Judge’s discretion and the Immigration
Judge may not have a [wholistic or accurate]understanding of what it
means to be stateless. 369 To combat this impediment, the DOJ should
provide training to immigration judges and clerks on the determination
of statelessness and its legal implications to hopefully increase the
likelihood that a stateless individual may be granted asylum. This
recommendation is practical because it does not require the passage of
legislation and it works within the United States’ current immigration
legal framework.
2)

A release from psychological, emotional, and mental insecurity

Stateless individuals are constantly under psychological, emotional,
and mental pressures because of uncertainties in the future due to the
lack of legal status and constant threat of deportation. 370 Many report
feelings of depression, anxiety, and hopelessness. 371 Some feel powerless
regarding their situation. 372 Some stateless individuals have to face
these psychological challenges while coping with trauma resulting from
persecution or violence in their home countries. 373 In these
367. KERWIN ET

AL.,

supra note 183, at 70.

368. Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 18.
369. KERWIN ET

AL.,

supra note 183, at 159.
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371. Id. at 74.
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373. Id.
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circumstances, the prospect of deportation exacerbates feelings of
anxiety and despair. 374
The need for release from these psychological, emotional, and
mental pressures are impeded by the perpetual check-in requirements
associated with order of supervision requirements and time spent in
detention while waiting for the United States government to exhaust
its attempts to deport. 375 One practical change that the United States
can implement is reducing the need for order of supervision check-ins
from once every few months to once a year. This change is practical in
two ways. One, there is no need for new legislation. INA Section
241(a)(3), gives DHS the discretion to release an alien under orders of
supervision. 376 Further, there are already regulations in place that give
the DHS the discretion to determine how often the alien must report
to an immigration officer. 377 Two, this reduction complies with existing
ICE policy, which requires all aliens released from ICE custody into the
United States to report to ICE at least once a year; so, there is no need
to wait for changes in ICE policy. 378 The second practical change that
the United States can implement is releasing all stateless detainees.
This recommendation is practical because it also does not require new
law. The INA authorizes DHS to arrest, detain, remove, or release
foreign nationals subject to removal. 379
3)

Economic Stability

Due to their lack of identifying documents, many stateless persons
cannot obtain loans, credit cards, or basic bank accounts.380 To
financially support themselves, they need to work. To work as a foreign
national, they need work authorization. 381 INA Section 241.5(b) states
that the immigration officer may, in his or her discretion, grant
employment authorization to the alien if the alien cannot be removed
in a timely manner (e.g., because of the refusal of the country of
removal to accept the alien), or the alien’s removal is “impracticable or
374. Id.
375. See id. at 72.
376. HILLEL R. SMITH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IMMIGRATION DETENTION: A
LEGAL OVERVIEW (2019). See Immigration and Nationality Act §241(a),
8 U.S.C. 1231 (2020).
377. See SMITH, supra note 376.
378. AUDREY SINGER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IMMIGRATION: ALTERNATIVES
TO DETENTION (ATD) PROGRAMS 5 (2019).
379. Id. at 7.
380. KERWIN ET
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supra note 183, at 71.
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contrary to the public interest.” 382 The words to focus on here are “may”
and “in his or her discretion.” This discretionary authority means that
while some stateless individuals released from detention may work,
others may not. There is a need to combat this inconsistency and ensure
that stateless individuals can financially support themselves and
participate fully in the United States’ economy. This need can be met
by DHS’s automatic provision of fee-exempt identity and work
authorization documents that does not require annual renewal to
individuals determined to be stateless. This recommendation is
practical because DHS has provided limited administrative measures
for stateless individuals on a case-by-case basis. 383 DHS can expand
these administrative measures to make them more accessible to a
greater number of stateless individuals.
4)

Freedom to Travel

Stateless individuals in the United States are restricted from
international travel and those under orders of supervision cannot travel
outside of their state of residence or region. 384 These travel restrictions
make it difficult for them to see family abroad and domestically. 385 They
can also impede a stateless individual’s career by making it difficult for
them to attend business trips and travel for conferences. 386 This
impediment can be solved by DHS eliminating domestic travel
restrictions for stateless persons and allowing them to move and settle
where they want in the United States. DHS and DOS should also offer
documentation that allows stateless persons to return to the United
States after international travel. Further, state and local governments
should provide stateless residents with identification cards so that they
can travel within the United States.

Conclusion
Statelessness is an intractable problem for the United States and
the international community. They have no country to call home and
no country wants to welcome them. Without the protection of a
country, they are essentially “ghosts” and their needs are invisible.
Their invisibility makes them vulnerable to exploitation, slavery, child
382. 8 U.S.C § 1231(a)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(c)(2).
383. Citizens of Nowhere, supra note 3, at 28.
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trafficking, prostitution, police harassment, recruitment into the armed
forces, forced labor, and other abuse. 387 The world is taking steps to
mitigate this problem, 388 and the United States urgently needs to take
part. While there is no perfect solution to solving statelessness in the
United States, we can meet their immediate needs while we wait for a
comprehensive international solution and the passage of domestic
legislation that fully incorporates stateless individuals into the United
States’ immigration legal framework. Through better training from the
DOJ regarding the determination and legal consequences of
statelessness, immigration judges and clerks will be able to make more
informed asylum decisions and we can prevent more stateless
individuals from ending up in legal limbo. Through reducing the
frequency of check-ins with immigration officials under orders of
supervision and timely releases from detainment, we can alleviate the
daily psychological struggles of stateless individuals. Through the
provision of work authorizations, we can give stateless individuals the
opportunity to support themselves and meaningfully contribute to their
local community and the United States’ economy. And finally, through
the provision of travel documents, we can promote family unity and
encourage their career aspirations.
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